the Armies has fought. We believe, though, that each nation has concentrated its efforts too much upon its own front, with the result that the advantages which the Allies possess in personnel and resources have not been utilised to their maximum efficiency. The efforts of the British and French Armies on the Western Front; of the Italian Army on the Southern Front; and of the Russians in the East, though latterly co-ordinated in point of time, have not been sufficient to prevent an inferior enemy from overrunning first Serbia and latterly Roumania. This is a serious reflection on our common efforts, and it behoves each Government to do its utmost to rectify the fundamental error.

6. *This, then, is the primary reason for which we have asked this Conference to assemble, namely, to examine whether some method can be found for focussing the efforts of the Allies in such a manner that, during the year 1917, the enemy can be crushed, and finally defeated.* In fact, we ask that the Conference shall now give expression and find some practical solution to the principle* which was discussed at the Conference held in Paris on the 15th and 16th November last.

7. Assuming, then, that the principle of complete and united co-operation is accepted—and we feel sure that the Governments represented here to-day are bound to accept it—let us examine the present

military situation and seek how this principle can best be applied.

8. Unquestionably, the gravest problems confronting the Allies arise from the collapse of Roumania. The Russians have had to extend their front in order that the Roumanian Armies

* The principle of the common front and the pooling of Allied resources.